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ARE PROPERTY OWNERS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION FUNDS?
Andrew Hysell*
I. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION.

In the case of Northeast Connecticut Economic Alliance, Incorporated v. ATC Partnership(NortheastIi), the Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld a superior court's decision to consider the value of
grants and third party remediation funds in the context of calculating just compensation for a condemnation of polluted property.
Despite a contrary California appeals court decision, Northeast II s
conclusion is supported by law and fact. Because remediation
funds have value to a disinterested buyer, they should increase
property's market value by an amount that includes reductions for
any risks associated with rehabilitating polluted land. Takings law
permits the consideration of prospective events to affect current
property value if those events are reasonably likely to occur in the
near future. If a market as a practical matter does not value remediation funds, courts may modify their analysis in order to avoid
materially unfair compensation.
II. FACTS
The plaintiff in this case, the town of Windham, exercised eminent
domain over a piece of real property known as Windham Mills,
located within the town's boundaries. 1 For over a century, the
Windham Mills property was owned by American Thread and was
Andrew Hysell is a graduate of Georgetown Law and presently
works as legislative counsel for the Connecticut State Senate Democratic Caucus. Prior to his legal career, Andrew was employed as a legislative aide for
Congressman Tom Allen (ME- 1) and as a lobbyist for the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. Andrew is a founding member of the Connecticut Chapter of
the American Constitution Society.
I
See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P'ship (hereafter Ne. fl),
861 A.2d 473, 483-84 (Conn. 2004).
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used for the manufacture of textiles. The property suffered from
significant pollution as a result.2 The Plaintiff, believing the property to be virtually worthless because of its environmental damage,
filed a statement for compensation of one dollar for the "fair market value" (FMV) of the property.3 Defendant owner, ATC Part4
nership, disagreed with the property's valuation and initiated suit.
After consideration, the superior court awarded the Defendant $1.675M and both parties appealed.5 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that assessing a property's FMV, including factors such as the effect of environmental damage and remediation costs, was within the purview of the trial court. 6 However,
the NortheastI majority held that the trial court erred as a matter of
law in its exclusion of evidence of environmental damage and
remediation costs from the calculation of the FMV.7 The Supreme
Court rejected the categorical assertion that pollution under no circumstances alters the market price of real property. 8 Therefore, the
trial court could not dismiss the costs to cure environmental degradation without first examining the property in question.
The case was remanded to the superior court for a new
9
trial. The trial court used the sales comparison approach to calculate the FMV of the property.' 0 According to the court, "for a sale
to be 'comparable,' it should be of the 'same kind' as the subject
property" with adjustments for any differences." To compare the
See id. at 483.
See id.
See id.
See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P'ship, No. CV
940049248S, 1999 WL 12469361 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 14,1999).
6
See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P'ship (Ne. 1), 776 A.2d
1068, 1079 (Conn. 2001).
7
See id. at 1080. The cost to cure could not be excluded automatically.
8
See id.
9
Id. at 1085-86; see also Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance v. ATC P'ship, No.
X04CV940124630, 2003 WL 553265 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2003).
10
The comparative sales approach has long been an approved method for
ascertaining the FMV of property. See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, 2003 WL
553265, at *6 n.22.
11
See id; see also Sibley v. Middlefield, 120 A.2d 77, 80-81, n.22 (Conn.
1956). It is interesting to note that the American JurisprudenceTrials states that
"the comparable sales technique is often impracticable" in the case of a polluted
property due to factors like "the complexity of cleanup technologies, conflicting
2

3
4
5

COMPENSATION FOR REMEDIATION

2005]

property to clean land, the court included in its calculation the cost
of ameliorating the property's pollution as instructed by the Supreme Court.' The cost to cure was substantial and would have
otherwise reduced significantly the FMV of the property.13 However, the superior court also made the following findings of fact:
1)
2)

3)

A buyer would seek all potential
funds available to
14
costs;
defray environmental
$3M had been approved in clean up grants and
$200K had already been spent. American Thread had
assumed liability for environmental cleanup under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response,5 Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and;'
Eighty percent of the property's environmental damremediation grants
age could be offset by potential
6
and third party contributions.'

In the court's view, the combined value of the remediation grants
available to a hypothetical buyer and possible third party contributions offset the remediation costs for the property. Therefore, the
trial court added back the reduction of Windham Mill's market
value caused by its pollution. Based on these sources of remediation, the trial court concluded the property's FMV at the time of
the taking to be $1.75M. 17 With ten years of interest-the time period of the litigation-the award totaled $4M.18

scientific opinions as to appropriate remediation options, the attitudes of lenders,
restriction on uses, and the long-term effects of market stigma-all of which
must be separately evaluated." See 60 AM. JUR. Trials 447 §30 (2005).
12
See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, Inc., 2003 WL 553265, at *8.
13
See id.
14
See id. at 9.
15
See id. at 8; see also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002) [hereinafter CER-

CLA].
16
17

See id. at 9.
Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, Inc., 2003 WL 553265, at *9.
The trial court

found that 80% of remediation costs could be recovered by a hypothetical buyer.
18
Ne. II, 861 A.2d 473, 477 (Conn. 2004).
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Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the inclusion of remediation
grants and third party liability was improper.19 First, they claimed
that remediation funds were too speculative to increase the market
value of environmentally distressed property.20 A disinterested
buyer would not pay more merely for a promise to money. Second,
the Plaintiffs argued a private owner would be ineligible for the
21
$3M grant awarded to the original ATC/Windham partnership.
Because the FMV analysis considered a sale between private parties, only those grants available to a private party were relevant.
Finally, the Plaintiff contended that the trial court mischaracterized
potential third party contributions and remediation grants as rights
running with the land as a matter of law. 22 Because these funds
were not a component of the property interest in a strictly legal
sense, the Plaintiff contended that ascribing any value to them was
23
improper.
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected each of the Plaintiff's arguments and upheld the inclusion of remediation grants and
third party contributions in the assessment of Windham Mills'
FMV. The Court found as a matter of law that the consideration
by the superior court of "potential recovery of cleanup costs [both
remediation grants and third party contributions] in calculating the
property's FMV . . ." was proper. 25 In the Court's view, "[Grant]
moneys could only enhance the value of the property in the eyes of
a reasonable prospective buyer." 26 Further, the fact that the trial
court had made an error concluding that CERCLA liability "ran
with the land" was deemed harmless because, even if the liability
did not run with the land, "a variety of meritorious claims and defenses would [still] present legitimate issues for litigation" for a
new owner. 27 The Supreme Court therefore refused to find that the

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

See id. at 478.
See id. at 482.
See id.
See id. at 482, 487.
See id. at 488.
See id. at 486-87, 492.
See id. at 491.
See id. at 486.
Id. at 492
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lower court's inclusion of these factors was unreasonable. 28 Finally, the Supreme Court considered the Plaintiffs complaint that
the $3M grant was available only to a public entity. 29 The Supreme
Court apparently agreed, but noted that a new buyer could enter
into a similar public/private partnership.30 Because remediation
grants would be accessible to a new buyer through such a partnership, the Supreme Court held that the lower court had acted "well
within its discretion by considering the availability of state grant
funds in the calculation of FMV.'
Once the trial court's consideration of remediation was approved, the Supreme Court reviewed and concluded that the trial
court's conclusions of fact did not constitute an abuse of discretion.32 The Supreme Court held that the lower court's valuation of
these funding sources was reasonable. 33 It refused to disturb the
evidentiary findings of the trial court because of a "broadly inclu34
sive approach endorsed.. .in the context of property valuation"
that reflected "the deference" afforded to a trial court's conclusions
about issues in the context of determining FMV.35
While the NortheastII decision deals only with the issue of
compensation and does not address the scope of eminent domain, it
will have the practical effect of reducing the frequency of takings.
In Connecticut, an exercise of eminent domain over 3olluted property suddenly has the potential to be very expensive. 6 As a result,
the environmental policy underlying remediation grant programs
and third party liability statutes like CERCLA could be frustrated.
Municipalities may find themselves in the strange situation of
compensating private owners for grant funds bequeathed to an
owner from the public treasury. Governments therefore may
choose to forgo development plans involving eminent domain due
See id. at 492. The Court noted that the former owner was strictly liable
for repayment of remediation costs under federal law.
29
Seeid. at 488, n.16.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See id. at 488, 492.
33
See id. at 488, 491. The trial court did not "abuse its discretion."
34
See id. at 490-911.
35
See id. at 484.
36
State funding may be used for cleanup of polluted property.
28

6

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 13

to the expense despite a strong public interest supporting a particular condemnation. Further, legislatures may consider restricting
existing environmental remediation grant programs, especially in
instances involving possible future condemnations. 37 If other states
follow suit, similar effects could be seen around the country.
The significance of the Northeast II decision warrants a review of its conclusion and its underlying reasoning. The court did
not provide an expansive explanation for its decision. 3 8 Therefore,
it is useful to consider the opinion of a different court that conducted an extensive analysis of valuation remediation funds within
the context of a FMV calculation The California Appeals Court's
decision in Mola Development excluded remediation from a FMV
analysis. Mola Development involved the valuationof property for
state taxation purposes, not compensation for takings. However, as
the Plaintiffs in Northeast II realized, the basic model of a hypothetical market transaction is common to both a California tax assessment and a calculation of just compensation. Therefore, Mola
Development's rationale for the exclusion of remediation funds
from FMV may be relevant to a takings analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Mola Development Corp. v. Orange County Assessment Appeals Board holding: Remediation grants should not be considered in the calculation of FMV.
Prior to Northeast II, the question of whether the value of remediation funds may properly be included in the calculation of FMV for
the purpose of a takings apparently had not been directly addressed
by a court anywhere in the country. 39 Without an authority to bolster their argument, the Northeast II plaintiffs relied upon a California appeals court decision regarding property valuation for taxation purposes to oppose the inclusion of remediation funds in the
37
Northeast II essentially forces government to compensate a property
owner for an expenditure of public funds via a bond program. Governments may
rethink their remediation grant programs as a result.
38

39

Ne. II, 861 A.2d 473, 485.
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calculation of FMV.4 ° Mola Development involved a taxpayer
challenge of an assessment appeals board's decision that included
the value of environmental remediation funds in the valuation of
polluted, non-income producing land for taxation purposes.41 The
Mola Development court disagreed with the board's decision and
rejected as a matter of law the inclusion of remediation funds beno market value and
cause, in its view, those funds had virtually
42
property.
the
from
distinct
were legally
The court began by first referencing California's constitutional mandate to value property for taxation purposes according to
fair market value.43 To ascertain a meaning for FMV, the court
looked to the relevant California tax code prescription for assessing a property's value for taxation purposes. Section 110, subdivision (a) of the California Tax Code defined FMV to mean "the
amount of cash or its equivalent that property would bring if exposed for sale in the open market under conditions in which neither
buyer nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the
other, and both the buyer and the seller have knowledge of all the
uses and purposes to which the property is adapted and for which it
is capable of being used, and of the enforceable restrictions upon
those uses and purposes." 44 The Court ultimately concluded that
under this definition, remediation funds should not be included in a
property's FMV.45
To reach its conclusion, the court first eliminated any potential policy arguments in support of remediation valuation on the
grounds that anything beyond a rigid FMV analysis was constitutionally impermissible. The court noted that in California and other
states, property valuation for taxation purposes was a strictly legal
40
41

See id. at 486.
See Mola Dev. Corp. v. Orange County. Assessment Appeals. Bd., 95

Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (2000).
42
See id. at 559.
43
CAL. CONST., Art. XIII, § 1, (a) ("All property is taxable and shall be
assessed at the same percentage of fair market value.").
44
Mola Dev. Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552 (quoting Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code § 11D(a) (Deering 2005)). Note the court assumed the constitutional fitness of this tax provision, not questioning whether the FMV formula defined in
§ 110 was sufficient to ascertain the FMV requirement found in Article XIII of
the California State Constitution.
45
See Mola Dev. Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.

8
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issue. 46 Questions of whether a valuation model would promote the
cleanup of polluted property generally or would ensure an owner
recouped his reasonably expected investment were therefore irrelevant. 47 The court went so far as to excuse itself preemptively
from culpability for negative policy consequences resulting from
its decision, reiterating the constitutional character of FMV pre48
cluded anything beyond a strict legal analysis.
Mola Development also concluded that remediation funds
did not increase the market value of polluted land. 49 That position
is extreme in the sense that it rejects placing any value on what is
essentially cash money available to a potential buyer. The court
reached its determination in three steps. First, it focused exclusively on the risks and pitfalls of purchasing polluted property
from the perspective of an objective buyer. These disadvantages
included (1) the risk of partial or complete failure in an attempt to
remediate,5 0 (2) the possibility of a property acquiring a negative
"stigma" that remains despite the property's rejuvenation, 51 and (3)
potential exposure to the "draconian realities of CERCLA liability."' 52 In total, the court found these drawbacks so severe they cast
serious doubt on the assertion that an ordinary buyer would pay
more for polluted land that carried with it a right to remediation.
See id. at 551-52. The Mola Develop. court noted that other state
supreme courts, including those in Massachusetts and New Jersey, adopted a similar viewpoint. These state courts agreed that "considerations of public policy"
were not meant for matters of property tax valuation because of the "constitutional mandated focus on value is a matter independent of public policy." See
id., see also Inmar Assoc'n, Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 549 A. 2d 38 (N.J.
1988) and Reliable Electronic v. Bd. of Assessors, 573 Ne. 2d 959 (Mass. 1991).
47
See Mola Dev. Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
48
"If environmental cleanup laws have the unintended consequences of
lowering the market value of commercial real property for tax assessment purposes, then that is what they do, for better or worse." Id. at 559-60.
49
"The idea that a prudent buyers might be willing to lessen the discount
that they would demand on sale of the property in light of the fact that parties
other than the seller might also have to contribute to the cleanup costs simply
does not accord with market reality.... Id. at 557-58.
46

50

51

See id. at 553-54.

See id.
See id.
53
"[U]nder any standard pegged to what buyers and sellers do in an open
market, it is almost impossible to imagine prudent buyers not demanding at least
52
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Second, any value that polluted land in conjunction with
remediation funds had above and beyond polluted land with no
54
funds, the court explained, was purely subjective to the seller.
According to Mola Development, an owner was ultimately "stuck"
with the responsibility of pollution remediation, while a buyer had
no corresponding obligation. 55 The seller thus benefited from
remediation funds in a manner that the buyer did not.56 The court
cited an axiom of property valuation that market value must be assessed in a manner excluding the "peculiar circumstances of the
seller." 57 The court viewed remediation funds as something outside
the "value to potential purchasers generally, and the normal uses to
which potential purchasers could put it." 58 Through the application
of a strict FMV analysis-as the court insisted repeatedly was required under Article XIII-anything not valued by a regular buyer
was irrelevant to assessing a property for taxation purposes.
Finally, the court rejected assessing a dollar value to remediation funds that a buyer would acquire and a seller would lose
59
through the transfer of ownership of the contaminated property.
The court considered the remediation funds an intangible interest
that had no legal connection to the land. 60 Therefore, even though
the buyer would receive an extra benefit from remediation funds,
the value of those funds was legally separate from the value of the
property. 61 The court analogized that giving a subsequent buyer
indemnification through CERCLA was the equivalent of handing
over the deed along with a "blank check. 62 The remediation funds

a dollar-for-dollar deduction of cure costs-reduced, of course, to present value."
See id. at 554-55.
54
See id. at 558.
55
See id.
56
57

58

"Buyers only care that they don't pay them." Id. at 548.
See id. at 548-49.

See id. at 558 (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Orange County.,

187 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1148). This principle is well established within the
realm of calculating just compensation for takings.
59

60
61
62

See id. at 557.
See id. at 558-59.
See id. at 559.
See id. at 557.
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available-the blank check-was a distinct property interest
from
63
value.
property's
the
to
relevance
no
the land and thus had
The Plaintiffs in Northeast II cited Mola Development's
conclusion as applicable to the assessment of FMV in a takings
environment.64 They argued that because remediation funds were
an entirely separate interest whose value was severely compromised in the eyes of a prudent buyer, a purchaser in a market trans65
action would not pay more than the polluted value for a property.
Without market value, a potential remediation grant therefore
should not be included in FMV the Plaintiff contended.66
As previously mentioned, the Connecticut Supreme Court
flatly rejected Mola Development's conclusion. The Court declared
that it historically had taken a "broad view" of the factors relevant
to FMV.67 According to the Court, evidence of both cost to cure
and remediation funds therefore could be admitted within this
broad scope and the
trial court would then give it the "proper [evi68
dentiary] weight.,
At first, a reasonable person might find the idea of compensating an owner for remediation funds entirely unreasonable. However, after considering flaws in Mola Development's hypothetical
market transaction, it appears likely that markets would in fact
value remediation. But, even if a market viewed remediation funds
to lack any objective value, the principles of takings jurisprudence
extend a FMV analysis beyond the confines of the California constitution. Issues of fundamental fairness can prompt a court to
modify or abandon a FMV analysis in order to achieve just compensation.
B. Mola Development's FMV analysis of polluted property mischaracterizes the interest of a hypothetical buyer and ignores
the compulsion of a hypothetical seller to sell.
63

See id.

64

Ne. II, 861 A.2d 473, 486 n. 18 (Conn. 2004).

65

66
67

See id. at 481-82.

See id.
See id. at 487 n.18 (citing Andrews v. Cox, 17 A. 2d 507 (Conn.

1941)).
68
Seeid. at 487 n.18.
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1. The court incorrectly assumed that a hypothetical buyer
only seeks clean land, therefore incorrectly concluding remediation funds are irrelevant to a FMV analysis.
Remediation funds should have objective value to a hypothetical purchaser interested in making profits because remediation
tends to improve the value of polluted property. Funds, when used
to implement environmental rehabilitation programs, usually improve the quality of land. 69 Higher land quality results in improved
uses and increased economic value. 70 Short of a market failure, 71 a
self-interested buyer should consider the availability of remediation funds to add something to the value of polluted property. How
can two polluted pieces of property-one with access to millions
of dollars for its cleanup and the other with no claim to anythingbe valued identically by a rationale market?
Acknowledging that remediation funds improve the value
of land contradicts Mola Development's assertion that prior to their
use the funds are worthless to a prospective buyer. 72 This contradiction springs from an assumption central to Mola Development's
FMV analysis: the court assumed a hypothetical buyer was only

69

For a complete listing of available cleaning technologies for air, earth,

and water, that includes a standardized rating for their cost and efficacy; see
FRTR Remediation Technology Screening Matrix and Reference Guide, Version 4.0, available at http://www.frtr.gov/matrix2/section3/table3_2.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2006).
70
Wisconsin Brownfields Program reported a potential $227M increase
in taxable property values from remediation grants and 507 acres of land returned to productive use. See BROWNFIELDS, INFO. ON THE PROGRAMS OF EPA
AND SELECTED STATES, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 67 (GAO-01-52) (Dec.
2000) [hereinafter Brownfields].
71
"Market failure is defined as the inability of markets to reflect the full
social costs or benefits of a good, service, or state of the world. Therefore, when
markets fail, the result will be inefficient or unfavorable allocation of resources." MARLIES WIERENGA, ELAW, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.elaw.org/assets/
word/What%20is%20environmental%20economics%20%2D%202.doc
(lasted
visited Jan. 5, 2006).
72

See Mola Dev. Corp. v. Orange County. Assessment Appeals. Bd., 95

Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 558 (2000).
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interested in purchasing clean land.7 3 Based upon that misconception, the court reasoned that clean alternatives to the polluted property would virtually erase any market value for remediation
funds. 74 Because of the risks and costs associated with remediation, a reasonable buyer seeking clean land would ignore the existence of remediation funds and simply pick a clean alternative.7 5
Mola Development's narrow characterization of a hypothetical
buyer's interests skewed its FMV analysis to the point where the
court essentially concluded that access to free money was worth
nothing.
Contrary to the court's assumption that buyers only seek
clean property, there are private parties interested in purchasing
polluted land in hopes of rehabilitating and then either selling the
property at a profit or putting the land to a higher economic use. 76
While some purchasers will not have any interest in polluted land,
others may actually seek out distressed property in hopes of making a profit through its acquisition and subsequent rehabilitation.77
Anything that makes environmental cleanup cheaper, or possibly
even free, is of substantial value to such a developer. 78 Polluted
"[O]ne under no 'exigencies' forcing it to bargain for the property, can
save itself a tremendous headache simply by buying uncontaminated property."
Id. at 553.
74
See id. at 552-54.
75
See id. at 553 (noting that the "draconian consequences" of CERCLA
liability would literally scare away investors).
76
"ONeill Properties Group... [is] a Pennsylvania-based company that
specializes in the development of brownfields..." See Elizabeth Abbott, Eyesore
to Upscale, One Brownfield at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1.
77
For example, a company seeking to build a corporate headquarters
would not be interested in the delay or the speculation of remediation. However,
a speculative developer, hoping to buy inexpensive land, rehabilitate it, and then
construct condominiums, might actually seek out brownfields that have access
to environmental clean up funds.
78
Remediated brownfields become useful for economic development creating new jobs. See Jerome S. Chudzik, Graef, Anhalt, Schloemer & Associates, Inc., Brownfields And The Teeter-Totter Principle (2001),
http://www.brownfields2002.org/proceedings20O1/CV-07-01.pdf (last visited
Jan. 5, 2006); see also Heather Todd, State environmentalprogram helps owners raise value ofproperty in short time, SAN ANTONIO BUSINESS JOURNAL, JULY
17, 1998, at 1 ("Created two years ago by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC), the Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) is encour73
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land that can be purchased for less than the price of clean land and
be remediated through the expenditure of someone else's money
should be valued above and beyond what the market will pay for
polluted land sans funds.
The billions of dollars disseminated under federal, state,
and local government remediation programs is convincing evidence that private markets value remediation funds. 79 One Connecticut agency alone "provides up front cash grants up to $10 million to investors, developers and business owners who undertake
redevelopment projects" of brownfields 8 0 The purpose of a grant
under programs like these is to create an economic incentive for
private investors to purchase a polluted property they otherwise
would not. 81 As these grants entice buyers to encumber themselves
with less than environmentally pristine land, the logical conclusion
is that remediation funds have some measurable, objective market
value.
In Housing Authority v. Suydam Investors, the New Supreme Jersey court implicitly recognized that remediation funds,
because they objectively improve polluted land, have market
aging the remediation of polluted land while simultaneously boosting the Texas
real estate market."), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/ sanantonio/stories/1998/07/20/focusl.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2006); See also U.S.
E.P.A., BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT EFFORTS ARE BIG IN THE HEART OF
DALLAS 2 ("[B]rownfields restoration successes within Dallas include a former
pipe manufacturing plant that became a pallet recycling facility, creating 35 jobs
while retaining 60 others, and a former municipal landfill that was redeveloped
into a 15-acre plaza for restaurant, hotel, and office/warehouse."), available at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ pdf/ss-dalla.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
79
See U.S. E.P.A., BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP GRANTS ("Cleanup grants
provide funding for a grant recipient to carry out cleanup activities at brownfield
sites. An eligible entity may apply for up to $200,000 per site."), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oswer/cleanup/funding.htm (Last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
80
See CT. BROWNFIELDS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GRANTS FOR REDEVELOPMENT (2003), http://www.ctbrownfields.com/w3c/grantsredevelopment/index.html; see also Elyse Gittleman, Joseph R. Holstead, CT. OFFICE OF
FISCAL ADMINISTRATION/OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, BROWNFIELD
REMEDIATION PROGRAM REPORT 2 (Sep. 9, 2004) (table listing three separate

brownfield remediation programs), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R0666.htm.
81
See JOHN G. RAPPA, CT. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, STATE
BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION ASSISTANCE 1-2000-R-0636 (July 7, 2000).

14 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 13

value.82 The Supreme Court held that polluted property should be
valued as if its contamination had been removed.83 The condemner
would have the option of initiating a separate action for clean-up
costs and, hypothetically, these costs could be offset by remediation grants and third party contributions. 84 The rationale for automatically valuing polluted land as clean and then requiring the
government to sue for remediation, is the belief that remediation
will in fact restore the land's value.
Indemnification agreements can also "lessen the dimunition
in value associated with the contamination" by providing a source
of funding to offset rehabilitation costs. 85 If someone with the capacity to pay is legally required to remediate a property's pollution, a buyer has access to resources from somewhere other than
grants. In contrast, Mola Development viewed potential CERCLA
liability as something a buyer would fear, noting that the statute
can implicate subsequent nonpolluting owners in certain circumstances under a theory of strict liability.8 6 While the reach of
CERCLA is not something to be trifled with, developers can take
preemptive steps to protect themselves.8 7 In addition, buyers are
able to take shelter within statutory carve-outs from environmental
liability
made contingent upon their purchase of a polluted prop8
erty.

8

CERLCA liability, if assessed on a prior owner who has financial liquidity, in reality is an economic opportunity to a new owner. For example, in
Northeast I, the prior owner-manufacturer had admitted liability under CERCLA. Instead of the law burdening the property, it provided the new owner with
an additional source of remediation funding to help clean the property.
82

83
84
85

See Hous. Authority v. Suydam Investors, 826 A.2d 673 (N.J. 2003).
See id. at 676.
See id.
Karina M.Thomas & David B. Clayton, Challenging Valuations of

ContaminatedProperty,26-APR CoLo. LAW. 71 (1997).
86
See Mola Dev. Corp. v. Orange County. Assessment Appeals. Bd., 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 553-54 (2000).
87
See CERCLA, supra note 14, at 101(35) ("innocent landowners" exempted from liability).
88
See Brownfields, supra note 68, at 40. Massachusetts Brownfield Program "provides statutory liability protection to parties that did not cause or contribute to the contamination at a site." Id. at 52, 59 (describing similar liability
protection applicable in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for those who perform
cleanups).
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2. Mola Development's FMV analysis involves a seller that is
disadvantaged relative to a buyer.
The model hypothetical market transaction is a tool used by
courts to calculate property value for purposes of compensation
and taxation. The goal behind this valuation exercise is to reconstruct the kind of transaction that would occur naturally in a sale of
private property within the context of a free market. To create a
transaction that mirrors reality, a court must review past transactions as well as current market conditions. The court must then apply what it has learned from its review to the specific facts of the
property's value being adjudicated. In the analysis, the court essentially must put itself in the shoes of a buyer and seller and judge
89
how they would bargain.
For the hypothetical transaction to mirror the market and
generate an accurate property value, the relative positions of the
buyer and seller must be balanced. The integrity of the market
transaction therefore requires consideration of a willing buyer and
a willing seller, neither of whom have any unusual advantage or
vulnerability. 90 A transaction where a seller is subordinated to a
buyer fails to meet this standard. When the actions and interests of
a seller are given less regard vis-h-vis the buyer, the judicial analysis will likely result in an undervaluation of the property.
In the case before it, Mola Development applied a hypothetical transaction to gauge FMV that put a seller in an inferior
position relative to a hypothetical buyer. Courts have characterized
a "willing seller" to be one that is under no duress to sell, including
the Mola Development court itself.91 However, Mola Development
was not true to its own rhetoric, applying a transaction where the
seller was forced to offer his property for sale prior to the use of
remediation funds. Because the court refused to permit any valuation of remediation funds prior to their use, the transaction used by
See Olson v. U.S., 292 U.S.246, 257 (1934); see also D'Addario v.
Comm'r of Transp., 429 A.2d 890, 895-96 (Conn. 1980).
90
60 AM. JUR. Trials 447 §5 (2005).
91
See Mola Dev. Corp. v. Orange County. Assessment Appeals. Bd., 95
89

Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 547 (2000) (a transaction must consider a seller who is not
under 'any compulsion' to sell); see also Olson 292 U.S. at 257.
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Mola Development was one where a "buyer could take advantages
of the exigencies of the other." 92 The seller suffered from an exigency-the inability to remediate prior to the sale within the context of a hypothetical marketplace that did not value remediation
funds.
Mola Development rationalized any unfairness of its valuation formula by claiming it could not rightfully consider issues of
public policy in a narrow FMV legal analysis. 93 What the court
misunderstood was that its FMV formula-regardless of any public policy issues-failed to meet the basic requirements of a selfinterested market transaction. 94 The timing of the valuation preempted the expenditure of remediation funds and therefore the
model transaction essentially featured a seller under duress. As
such, the seller's position was the very proverbial barrel that neither party is supposed to find themselves over in a voluntary transaction. 9 Because the hypothetical market transaction applied by
the court was flawed, its ability to render an accurate FMV was
compromised.
The effect of the seller's exigency is acute when viewed in
the case of Windham Mills. ATC Partnership, in the court's view,
had likely access to substantial sums of remediation funds both
through a state grant and established third party CERCLA liability.
A rationale actor, assuming a market would not value those funds
at all, would first use them to ameliorate pollution before it sold
the property. Mola Development's own argument that a hypothetical buyer would not view remediation funds as having value supports the proposition that any self-interested seller would first
clean up polluted land with free money before putting it on the
market. Not doing so, in the opinion of the Northeast
II plaintiffs,
96
dollar.
one
worth
land
of
made a large parcel
92

Mola Dev. Corp. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547-48.

93
94

See id. at 551.
See id. at 547-48.
95
Hous. Authority v. Suydam Investors, 826 A.2d 673, 680-81 (N.J.
2003) (New Jersey court interprets 5th Amendment and New Jersey state consti-

tution to require a market transaction where neither the seller or buyer are "under any compulsion to act.")
96

Ne. II, 861 A.2d 473, 478 (Conn. 2004). How a future event can be
considered is explained later.
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3. Risk should not act to bar the valuation of remediation
funds, but should instead reduce their worth to a hypothetical
buyer and thereby reduce compensation to the owner.
Mola Development argued that, even if there was some expectation of improvement in the quality of polluted real property,
no reasonable buyer would pay extra for polluted land even with
access to remediation funds due to the risk and uncertainty associated with remediation attempts and possible residual stigma. 97 This
assertion has some validity because a prudent buyer, without any
accommodation, might find the risk and administrative hassles of
buying polluted property prohibitive, even with access to remediation funds. However, risk alone does not automatically deter a
buyer if a discount in price is offered to offset potential downsides
of remediation. A discount for risk essentially
makes the existence
98
of that risk more palatable to investors.
Markets adjust for risk through discounting instead of simply jettisoning transactions. The practice of discounting for risk
and inconvenience is seen when bad loans are purchased for pennies on the dollar by collection agencies and high insurance premiums are issued for equally high-risk drivers. In a similar fashion, if
remediation funds exist to clean fouled land and such expenditure
would likely increase the land's value, a rationale market should
ascribe some value to those funds. The risks associated with a
planned remediation project should not automatically preclude its
consideration, but instead reduce to a degree its impact on the
property's value. 99 It is reasonable to assume a buyer would pay
See Mola Dev. Corp. at 318. See also Roger Beers, Stigma Damages in
Property Contamination Cases, http://www.rbeerslaw.com/stigma.html ("Now
they can't sell their property - except to speculators who are betting that the
"stigma" will disappear with time.").
98
See
Peter Small,
Discounting for Risk, available at
97

http://www.stigmergicsystems.com/stig-vl /stigrefs/stigfinance/page3.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2006).
99
Christopher Serkins, See the Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 691 (2005).
("[E]xpanding and contracting the anticipated development costs that would be
necessary to create the property's highest and best use will shift the burden of
those risks of development in a hypothetical transaction between a wiling buyer
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for the right to access remediation funds if given a deduction for
the associated risks and expense of cleaning the property.
Courts have the ability to calculate a discount for risk and
apply that discount to reduce a property's highest economic value.
For example, Christopher Serkins explains that where a condemned property's highest value is calculated, future development
of that property with a discount for risk can be considered.' 00
Serkins notes that the property's best use value should deduct both
the costs of development as well as the risks associated with development [italics added], including "environmental hazards, cost
overruns, unscrupulous contractors ...10 In other words, "[t]he
baseline rules about who bears development risk are reflected in
fair market value, and therefore affect compensathe property's
1°
tion.
4. Intangible factors that are not part of land in a legal sense
frequently affect the market value of real property.
Mola Development did entertain the possibility that under
some circumstances, polluted land with a right to remediation
funds might fetch a nominally higher price than simply polluted
land standing alone. 10 3 Therefore, in order to justify the complete
exclusion of remediation in light of the possibility of some market
value, the court stressed the "separateness" of the funds in a legal
sense from the land itself.10 4 In Mola Development's view, the
funds were a distinct legal interest and therefore could not properly
be characterized as part of the property. 10 5 Because the funds were

and willing seller. Including insurance costs and fees associated with permit
applications will lower the present value of the property by shifting costs to the
property owner").
o
See id. at 690.
See id. at 691; see id. at 692.
101
See id. at 691. See also id. at 692.
102
See Mola Dev. Corp. v. Orange County. Assessment Appeals. Bd., 95
103
Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 558 (2000).
See id. at 558-59.
104
105
See id. at 557-59.
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not a legal right running with the land, a sep6arate contract would
be required to bequeath them to a purchaser. 6
The flaw with this argument is that many intangible factors-characteristics that do not run with the land in a legal
sense-have been recognized by courts to affect the market value
of real property.' 0 7 Future zoning changes and the likely prospect
for development, while not legal rights in any sense, amount to
value in the eyes of a buyer. 0 8 If a market ascribes additional
value to a piece of land, that fact in and of itself warrants inclusion.
The ethereal nature of a factor that removes it from the basket of
rights formally associated with a piece of real property is therefore
irrelevant. It should be included in the FMV analysis because what
the market will bear for the property has increased as a result of its
existence.
Consider a private party wishing to purchase a piece of land
and assume normally polluted property is worth $10 per acre.
However, this particular brown field has a near certain claim to a
$1M grant that, when spent over the course of one year, will likely
render the land suitable for residential development. As developed
property, the land is worth $1000 per acre. A rational buyer with a
desire to develop would measure risks and costs and then, based on
calculations, ascribe some additional value to polluted land for its
claim to the $1M.
C. Articulating a legal rationale for the inclusion of remediation funds to assess just compensation.
Based upon the preceding analysis of the arguments underlying the Mola Development decision, it is apparent that a hypothetical market transaction should not, as a rule, exclude the value
of remediation funds. Remediation funds have the potential to improve the objective value of land. This potential improvement is
foreseeable and any risk associated with its achievement can be
106
107

108

See id. at 557.
See id. at 557-58.
See Peter Rock Assoc. v. Town of North Haven, 756 A.2d 290, 335

(Conn. 2000) (citing Minicucci v. Comm'r of Transp., 559 A.2d 216 (Conn.
1989)).
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discounted. Ultimately, the potential to improve land with remediation funds is an opportunity for a disinterested buyer to make
money and the fact that the remediation funds are not part of the
land legally does not preclude their valuation within the context of
a market transaction.
Upon concluding that a market should value remediation
funds, the next step is to integrate that understanding into existing
takings jurisprudence. Two issues previously discussed need to be
addressed. First, future remediation is an event that has not occurred at the time of takings. It is necessary therefore to consider
how takings law treats future events in determining just compensation. Also, not every market is efficient. In the case of an inefficient market, remediation funds may be undervalued. It needs to be
resolved what flexibility a Connecticut court has beyond a strict
FMV analysis.
1. Just compensation and how courts define it.
The Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause bars government action that has the effect of "forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' 0 9 The United States Supreme
Court has held that just compensation requires that "no private
property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact
equivalent for it be returned to the owner," 10
I with the qualification
that a property owner "be made whole but is not entitled to
more."' ' To ensure fair compensation is paid, the property's best,
most lucrative use is considered. 12 However, an owner's own par109
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (quoting Armstrong v.
U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
110
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S. 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1993); see

also Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003). The court lists a
variety of property interests, when encroached upon, qualify as a compensable

takings including a temporary occupation of a leasehold, appropriating part of a
roof for an antenna, and the invasion of private airspace.
II
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); see also U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945) ("[T]he owner must be put in as
good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.").
112
60 AM. JUR. Trials447 §8 (2005).
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ticular special purpose that cannot be translated into objective
3
value for a hypothetical buyer is removed from consideration."1
The Connecticut Constitution has also been interpreted to
provide similar protections in the context of takings, requiring that
"just compensation" be paid where a person is deprived of real4
property through a governmental exercise of eminent domain."
Connecticut courts have adopted a measure of FMV that mirrors
federal and other state jurisprudence, saying valuation equals a
market transaction where "a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller based on the highest and best possible use of the land assuming that a market exists for such an optimum use."'" 5 In addition,
"the loss to the owner from the takings, and not its value to the
condemner, is the measure of damages to be awarded in eminent
domain proceedings." 116 The court also has said just compensation
requires that a market value be paid for a property that evaluates
the land's best use at the time of the taking. 1
When presented with both state and federal takings claims,
the Connecticut Supreme Court has chosen not to differentiate between the protections afforded by the United States Constitution
and those found in Article First, §11 of the Connecticut Constitution. " 8 In Melillo v. New Haven, the court upheld a finding that the
rights afforded by §11 were sufficient to provide just compensation
to claimants, effectively rendering redundant the party's concurrent
113

General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 383 (describing A business person's

good-will as not translatable to another and therefore not affecting market
value); see also U.S. v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 130 (1950)
("The general rule has been that the Government pays current market value for
property taken, the price which could be obtained in a negotiated sale, whether
the property had cost the owner more or less than the price.").
114
See U.S. CONST. Amend. V; see also CONN. CONST. art. I, §11.
115
Robinson v. Westport, 610 A.2d 611, 612-13 (Conn. 1992).
116
Gray Line Bus Co. v. Greater Bridgeport, 449 A.2d 1036, 1042 (Conn.
1982); see also Ne. 11, 861 A.2d 473,481-82 (Conn. 2004) (noting that the probability of property being put to its most valuable use is also considered).
117
See Ne. II, 861 A.2d at 481-82.
118
See Melillo v. New Haven, 732 A.2d 133, 136 (Conn. 1999); see also
Tuchman v. State, No. CV030472731S 2003, WL 22078674 at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); see also Tuckel v. Town of Southbury, 172 A. 222, 223-24
(Conn. 1982) ("Both the Connecticut and the federal constitutional provisions
limit the right to compensation to those instances in which there has been a taking of property.").
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assertion of a Fifth Amendment takings violation.'1 9 The Melillo
court's conclusion is significant because the takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12 A trial court recently applied Melillo to hold that
both the federal and state constitutional compensation rights are
coterminous. 12

Federal and state courts use the FMV analysis to meet the
constitutional standard of just compensation. 122 The quantitative
FMV analysis helps distill the more theoretical notion of just compensation into a more practical form in order to ascertain payments
for specific government takings. While the "fair market value of
property on the date it is appropriated" is the rule for calculating
compensation, "other measures are employed only when market
value is too difficult to find or when its application would result in
manifest injustice to owner or public."l 2 3 Courts often use one of
three types of FMV calculations. The comparable sales approach is
the most commonly used and, as its name indicates, compares sales
of similarly situated property to estimate value for the seized
land. 124 If the comparable sales approach is impracticable, the
25
court will use a reproduction cost or capitalization approach.

Melillo, 732 A.2d at 143-44, n.28; see also Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 F.3d 118, 126-27. (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the Melillo decision as effectively barring both a state and federal takings
claim)..
120
See Miller v. Town of Westport, 842 A.2d 558, 559 (Conn. 2004). (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). Therefore, in other
words, because states must comply with the dictates of the 5th Amendment takings clause, a finding that a state constitutional takings procedure is sufficient to
pay just compensation for the seizure of property implies at least parity between
the federal and state right.
121
See Tuchman, 2003 WL 22078674 at *13-14.
122
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001); see also Ne.
119

1, 861 A.2d at 481-82.
123
Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
124
See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance v. ATC P'ship, No. X04CV940124630,
2003 WL 553265, at *13-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2003).
125
"The instances in which market value is too difficult to ascertain generally involve property of a type so infrequently traded that we cannot predict
whether the prices previously paid, assuming there have been prior sales, would
be repeated in a sale of the condemned property." U.S. v. 564.54 Acres of Land,
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The reproduction formula, or cost approach, starts from scratch
and rebuilds the property, calculating the cost of doing so minus
any depreciation. 126 The capitalization approach takes an income
producing property and capitalizes its future income to derive a
present value. 127 The formula selected and applied by the court is
dictated by a property's characteristics to ensure accurate valuation. 121

Depending upon the formulae used to assess FMV, prices
being paid for real estate in a relevant market, improvements to the
property, and possible economic uses for the land are considered. 129 However, FMV may also be affected by additional factors,
30
some of which may be purely idiosyncratic to the property itself.1
It is therefore understood that "an owner's compensation depends
so much on the facts of a case that no rigid formula is appropriate."' 3 1 Practically speaking, this means that in the course of a trial
a court must sift through data and analysis presented by both parties on the issue of valuation, processing that information through a
formula of its choice in order to reach a judicial determination of
FMV.132 In order to calculate an accurate FMV and provide constitutionally required "just compensation," trial courts are bequeathed
broad discretion to admit and establish the relevancy of evidentiary
33
factors.1

2. The "time of taking" requirement of a takings analysis does
not preclude the prospective consideration of pending events in
More or Less, Situated in Monroe and Pike Counties, Pa., 441 U.S. 506, 513
(1979).

126

See Ne. Conn. Econ. Alliance, WL 553265, at *4.

127

See 56 AM. JUR. POF 3d 419, §16.

For example, comparable sales of real estate may not be available for
certain unique properties.
129
26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 310 (2005).
130
See Ne. II, 861 A.2d 473, 482-83 (Conn. 2004) ("[E]ach parcel of prop128

erty is in some ways unique...").
132

AM. JUR.2D Eminent Domain § 271 (2005).

When there is no relevant market for the property, the valuation method

can be on that is simply "just and equitable." MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE
§ 1004(a).
133
See Eminent Domain, supra note 129; see also N.E. I1,861 A.2d. at
484-85.
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the valuation of property when those events are likely to occur
in the reasonably near future.
Assuming that remediation has value once applied, it must
be resolved whether a seller can receive compensation for its expectation of retaining the land long enough to remediate it. The
Supreme Court addressed and rejected the notion that, as a general
rule, a seller has the "right of retention."' 134 The Court held in
Commodities Trading Corp. v. U.S. that pepper acquisitioned by
the Government from a private investor need not be given additional value to compensate for the investor's intent to speculate on
increased postwar prices and therefore to hold onto the goods. The
Court acknowledged that FMV could be higher than current prices
"because a buyer anticipates future rises in prices." 135 However,
because projecting future prices was much too speculative and
would discriminate against dealers of perishable goods, the Court
held the general rule, short of "exceptional circumstances," did not
include a right to retention. 136
However, some future events affecting value can be factored into the price of a piece of property. The Supreme Court has
held that a property's valuation can "include market value it may
command because of the prospects for developing it to the 'highest
and best use' for which it is suitable."' 137 The Court subsequently
specified that future pecuniary worth must be established "with
certainty sufficient to persuade a purchaser of the business to pay
for its capitalized value." 138 The Fifth Circuit found this to be the
case because 'a hypothetical.. .buyer will purchase land with an
eye to not only its existing use but to other potential uses as
well. ' 139 A party must show a reasonable probability that the land
is both physically adaptable for such use and that there is a need or

134
135
136

137
138
139

Commodities Trading Corp. v. U.S., 339 U.S. 121, 130 (1950).
See id. at 126.
See id. at 126-28.
Olson v. U.S., 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. I(1949).
U.S. v. 125.07 Acres of Land, More or Less, 667 F. 2d 243 (1st Cir.

1981) (quoting U.S. v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less, Ect, 605 F.2d 762,

781 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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demand for such use in the reasonably near future. 140 The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland found admissible expert
testimony as to an estimated date (roughly three to four years after
the time of the taking) when the property could be put to its best
and most profitable use, since 14this
expert opinion was "sufficiently
1
reliable."'
and
non-speculative
The Connecticut State Supreme Court has concurred with
federal courts on this matter, holding that future change, if reasonably probable and not merely speculative, may be considered 142
in
domain.
eminent
by
taken
property
of
FMV
of
the determination
For example, consideration of a future, reasonably probable zoning
change ought to be considered as it affects the present value of
property. 143 Other states have agreed. Evidence has been held to
encompass "relevant facts at the time of the taking" and "may include those144that have a bearing on an available future use of the
property."'
The American Jurisprudence Trials (AJT) also endorses the
consideration of a reasonably probable future use to determine
FMV and specifically notes that remediation fall into this category.
The AJT states "if a third party's liability for cleanup has been or
is likely to be established [emphasis added], or if a state fund will
pay for the cleanup, the market-and the courts-may disregard
direct cleanup costs in determining property value."14 AJT's approach uses the term "likely" to screen out speculative funds and
retain only remediation funding that is probable at the moment the
land is seized. If the reasonable probability of a future use can be
established, that use in turn can be factored into the property's
value for compensation purposes. The door is open to taking heed
See U.S. v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 633 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1980).
Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Prince
George's County, Md., 450 F. Supp. 122, 127 (D.C. Md. 1978).
142 Robinson v. Westport, 610 A,2d 611, 612-13 (Conn. 1992); see also Tandet
140

141

v. Urban Redevelopment Comm'n, 426 A.2d 280, 284-85 (Conn. 1979).
143
See Peter Rock Assoc. v. Town of North Haven, 756 A.2d 290, 293
(Conn. 2000) (citing Minicucci v. Comm'r of Transp., 559 A.2d 216 (Conn.
1989)).
144
State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Silver, 457 A.2d 463, 467-68 (N.J.
1983); see also Jersey City Redev. Agency v. Mack Prop., 656 A.2d 35 (N.J.
1995).
145
60 AM. JUR. Trials 447 §30 (2005).
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of a seller's planned use of remediation funds contingent upon
meeting the reasonableness test.
The faithful application of the "time of takings" requirement reins in attempts to compensate for speculative future events.
Under the Windham Mills scenario, at the time of the taking, ATC
Partnership had the right to funds because of its ownership of the
property being seized. ATC had acquired a grant and had begun to
spend it. In addition, liability for the property's remediation had
been assumed by American Thread, the prior owner of the property. The future value that would otherwise be realized by the
seller comports with the time of taking requirement if it is evidenced that the remediation funds are in hand and/or a right to
third party contribution is secure at the time of the taking.
3. Unlike Mola Development's interpretation of Article XIII of
the California constitution, takings jurisprudence considers
issues of fairness in the valuation of property that permits a
court to a modify, or even reject, the application of a FMV
analysis.
A court has the power to modify the use of a FMV standard
if an otherwise fundamentally unfair valuation would occur. In
contrast to Mola Development's assertion that public policy was
irrelevant to valuation in the context of property taxation under the
California constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the public policy issue of fairness can be considered in compensating for a takings. 146 The United States Supreme Court stated
clearly that "manifest injustice to an owner or the public" may justify a valuation of land being taken through a means other than
FMV. 147
States have echoed that compensation ultimately must meet
some minimum of fairness and have modified otherwise strict
FMV analysis as a result. For example, an Arkansas court held that
See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); see also
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
147
See id. A modification of, or a substitution for, a FMV analysis is necessary in order to avoid unfairness-or if traditional FMV models are unable to
calculate a value for a particular property.
146
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information discovered about property after the time of the taking
could be admitted to evidence on the grounds that to do so otherwise would be "a harsh rule."' 148 Arizona has read into the phrase
"just compensation" the understanding that a method for determining valuation must not be "unfair." 149 In addition, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has accepted reasonable alternatives to the three
traditional valuation methodologies-reproduction, comparative,
and capitalization-when these usual formulas have proven inade50
quate to measure a specific property.'
The Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted a rule that
"just compensation is an equitable [question] rather than a strictly
legal or technical one"' 51 elaborating that "other measures may be
appropriate when the fair market value measure of damages does
not fully compensate the owner." 152 Conversely, the court has not
viewed the adjudication of FMV in a takings situation as separate
from the realm of policy matters. In Arthur v. Town of Southbury,
the Connecticut Supreme Court cited "political choices and settlements" being outside "its competence" in the case of the town's
decision to discontinue a highway.153 The court held that it would
"stay its hand" and defer to "a local administrative response" before it would assess what compensation was proper.' 54 Connecticut
superior courts have applied these principles to ensure that wrong
doers not benefit under an assessment of FMV and that an owner
55
be compensated fully under the doctrine of "fair compensation.'
148

149
150

1972).
151

Little Rock v. Moreland, 334 S.W.2d 229, 229-30 (Ark. 1960).
Tucson v. Rickles, 505 P.2d 253, 256-57 (Ariz. 1973).

See State by Comm'r of Transp. V. MehIman 289 A.2d 539 (N.J.

Alemany v. Comm'r of Transp., 576 A.2d 503, 507 (Conn. 1990)
(Tuoting Colaluca v. Ives, 191 A.2d 340, 344 (Conn. 1963)).
See id.
153
Arthur v. Town of Southbury, 449 A.2d 1001, 1009-10 (Conn. 1982).
154
See id. See Ne. 11,861 A.2d 473, 477 (Conn. 2004) ("[T]he question of
what is just compensation is an equitable one rather than a strictly legal one.")
155
City of Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., No. CV9705722192004, WL
1462628, at *4-6 (Conn. Super. June 9, 2004) (quoting U.S. v. Virginia Electric
Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961) ("'[I]t would be manifestly unjust to permit a
public authority to depreciate property values by a threat... [of the construction
of a governmental project] and then take advantage of this depression in the
price which it must pay for the property' when eventually condemned.") see
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Remediation grants and the right to third party payments
can be permissibly included in FMV, even if valueless in the eyes
of a private buyer, if the court believe that not doing so would be
substantially unfair to the owner. Assuming the existence of a
market failure that renders remediation funds valueless to an objective buyer and the lack of a seller's ability to first remediate property as an abrogation of the "hypothetical" market transaction
where neither party is disadvantaged, a sufficient basis exists for
the court to modify the FMV analysis to include some value for
remediation funds. A fundamentally unfair assessment of value
would otherwise jeopardize a property owner's right to just compensation.
D. Calculating the Present Value of Property subject to remediation funds.
Based on the preceding analysis, environmental remediation funds should not be excluded from FMV calculations as to do
so may result in less than fair and just compensation for condemned property. Because profit-seeking purchasers would likely
consider access to remediation funds to varying extents depending
upon the facts specific to a case, a hypothetical FMV analysis
should not automatically rule them out. Further, a court can,
through the doctrine of fair compensation, ensure that the FMV
transaction does not involve the exploitation of an exigency of the
owner/seller. There may be many situations where remediation
funds would be in fact worthless in an open market. However, the
trial court should make that decision on a case-by-case basis rather
than simply excluding all funding sources as a matter of law.
To gauge the FMV of remediation funds as applied, a trial
court would first have to determine whether remediation would
generate, with a reasonable probability in the reasonable future, an
economically advantageous use. If not, the remediation funds
would be irrelevant under a FMV and could only be considered if
also City of Hartford v. Rozas, 1999 WL 492597 at *2 (Conn. Super. June 30,

1999) ) ("(Flairness dictates that we go back to 1995 when the subject was capable of producing income in order to determine the value of the subject property.").
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the Court found their exclusion much more than nominally unjust
to the owner. If remediation would create future economic value,
then the value created by each remediation dollar would be assessed. Resources allocated to remediation could generate more or
less than one dollar in property value per dollar spent. Therefore,
the improvement that results from the expenditure of the remediation resources, not the monetary value of the remediation funds
themselves, is relevant to FMV. Any future value that would result
from remediation should be capitalized to ascertain its current
worth.
Second, there may be a possibility that a remediation attempt will fail completely and an appropriate discount for that risk
is appropriate. Even if successful, a residual market stigma may
attach to a previously polluted property after remediation. The
court would need to assess, based upon expert testimony as well as
the nature of the pollution, both the likelihood of market stigma
attaching and the lingering financial effect of such prejudice. For
example, a former uranium enrichment facility would be a candidate for an enduring and highly prejudicial market stigma, while an
abandoned gas station would not. Finally, for an income producing
property that would essentially need to go "out of commission" in
order for the remediation to progress, a court could calculate loss
of income during periods of remediation. Taken together, these
factors would help determine the value of remediation funds to a
hypothetical objective buyer.

